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Against the background of closer diplomatic, political and security ties between 
Myanmar and China since 1988, their economic relations have also grown stronger 
throughout the 1990s and up to 2005. China is now a major supplier of consumer and 
capital goods to Myanmar, in particular through border trade. China also provides a 
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state-owned economic enterprises. Nevertheless, Myanmar’s trade with China has failed 
to have a substantial impact on its broad-based economic and industrial development. 
China’s economic cooperation apparently supports the present regime, but its effects on 
the whole economy will be limited with an unfavorable macroeconomic environment and 
distorted incentives structure. As a conclusion, strengthened economic ties with China 
will be instrumental in regime survival, but will not be a powerful force affecting the 
process of economic development in Myanmar. 
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1. Objectives 
Myanmar and China call each other “Paukphaw,” a Myanmar word for siblings. The 
word “Paukphaw” is never used for any other foreign country than China, reflecting 
their close and cordial relationship.1 As for Myanmar, China has historically been the 
far most important neighbor, sharing the longest border of 1384 miles. After Myanmar 
regained its independence in 1948, it welcomed the birth of the People’s Republic of 
China in the following year. The Sino-Myanmar relationship has been premised upon 
the five principles of peaceful co-existence, including mutual respect for each other’s 
territorial integrity and sovereignty and mutual non-aggression (Tin Maung Maung 
                                                 
1 According to DMLC [1993:266], “Paukphaw” means 1. sibling, 2. intimate, and is an 
affectionate term conferred upon the Chinese by the Myanmar people. 
Than [2003:190-191]). 
Nevertheless, independent Myanmar has been cautious about its relationship with 
China. In reality, Sino-Myanmar relations have undergone a series of ups and downs, 
and China has occasionally posed an actual threat to Myanmar’s security, such as the 
incursion of defeated Chinese Nationalist (Koumintang or KMT) troops into the 
northern Shan State in 1949 and confrontations between Burmese and resident 
overseas Chinese, including militant Maoist students in 1967. Indeed, the Myanmar 
leadership, extremely sensitive about the country’s sovereignty, independence and 
territorial integrity, had long observed strict neutrality during the Cold War, avoiding 
obtaining military and economic aid from the superpowers. 
Dramatic changes have emerged in the wake of the birth of the present government. 
The State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), later re-constituted as the 
State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), took power by military coup after the 
nationwide political unrest in 1988. The United States, the EU, Japan, and multilateral 
aid organizations all withheld ODA and some Western countries even imposed  
sanctions and weapon embargoes. Under mounting international pressures on the 
military regime, Yangon had no choice but to approach Beijing for their survival. As 
diplomatic, political and security ties grow closer, economic relations between the two 
countries have also strengthened. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the development and changes of 
Myanmar-China economic relations since 1988, and to evaluate China’s growing 
influence on the Myanmar economy. Thus the author tries to answer the question 
whether or not the Myanmar economy can survive and/or grow with reinforced economic 
ties with China in spite of its isolation in the international community. In other words, 
can China support the Myanmar economy even though Western countries have  
imposed economic sanctions on Myanmar? This question is also relevant to evaluate the 
impact and effectiveness of sanctions. 
The second section introduces a brief history on how the two countries have become 
the closest allies since 1988. The third section examines trade relations between 
Myanmar and China. The fourth section describes Chinese economic and business 
cooperation with Myanmar. Lastly, the author summarizes his arguments and 
eventually answers the above research question. 
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2. Historical and Political Background 
China had long adopted a dual-track approach toward Myanmar by endorsing 
party-to-party relations between the China Communist Party (CCP) and the Burma 
Communist Party (BCP), in addition to state-to-state relations. The CCP’s covert and 
overt support of the BCP, which resorted to armed struggle against the Myanmar 
government just after its independence, seriously hindered the two countries’ 
state-to-state relationship. 
When the military took power by coup in 1988, thousands of pro-democracy activists, 
including students, fled to the border area near Thailand, where numerous ethnic 
insurgencies were active.2  However, none of the ethnic rebels there could offer a 
meaningful amount of armaments. On the other hand, unlike the ethnic insurgents, the 
BCP located along the Chinese border had vast quantities of arms and ammunition that 
were supplied by China. A possible alliance of pro-democracy activists, ethnic rebels and 
the BCP with armed might could pose a real threat to Myanmar’s military government. 
However, a mutiny caused the BCP to split into four ethnic groups in early 1989. The 
CCP had already withdrawn its active support of the BCP after 1985 (Tin Maung 
Maung Than [2003:194]). Just before the end of the Cold War, China departed from its 
dual-track diplomacy and renounced its policy stance favoring the BCP. Having lost 
Beijing’s backing, the BCP collapsed in the year following SLORC’s establishment.3 On 
the other hand, Yangon luckily gained Beijing’s backing in the midst of Western 
ostracism.
The mutiny provided a golden opportunity for the Myanmar military to neutralize the 
newly emerged armed groups, and they were willing to pay any cost for this. Khin 
Nyunt, then Secretary One of the SLORC, wasted no time in going to the Chinese 
border and successfully achieved a ceasefire with these groups. For the ceasefire, the 
Myanmar government offered the ex-BCP mutineers development assistance such as 
roads, bridges, power stations, schools and hospitals and businesses opportunities 
including mining and lumbering concessions and border trade. 
Bertil Lintner, a veteran Southeast Asia correspondent, writes as follows: 
Ironically, at a time when almost the entire population of Burma had turned against 
                                                 
2 This part is based on Lintner [1998]. For detail see Lintner [1990] [1994]. 
3 Lintner [1990:45] reports that a major reason why the mutiny did not happen earlier 
was that the ordinary soldiers and local commanders were uncertain China’s reaction to 
such a move. 
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the regime, thousands of former insurgents thus rallied behind the ruling military. 
The threat from the border areas was thwarted, the regime was safe, but the 
consequences for the country, and the outside world, were disastrous (Lintner 
[1998:170]). 
Than Shwe, then Vice Chairman of the SLORC, accompanied by Khin Nyunt, visited 
Beijing in October 1989 and laid the foundations for the current partnership between 
the two countries. The visit also marked a departure from Myanmar’s past practice on 
arms imports, i.e., that it eschewed large arms purchases from the superpowers 
pursuant to a policy of strict neutrality (Jannuzi [1998:198-199]). The SLORC 
apparently launched an ambitious plan to enlarge and modernize the tatmadaw, the 
Myanmar armed forces, by late 1988 or early 1989 with heavy reliance on Chinese 
armaments (Selth [1996:19]). At the same time, the military leaders successfully 
extracted a promise of economic and technical cooperation from China. 
Unless China’s diplomacy toward Myanmar changed and the BCP broke up, the 
power ownership and structure may not have been the same as present. Arms transfers 
and economic ties have dramatically increased China’s influence on and within 
Myanmar. Indeed, a few years of military and economic aid have turned the non-aligned 
state of Myanmar into China’s closest ally. Now, the military government is effectively 
dependent on China for its survival and, some analysts say, it has become a Chinese 
client state (Ott [1998:71-72]). 
3. Trade Relations 
(1) Important but Unbalanced Trading Partner 
China occupies an important position in Myanmar’s external trade. Table 1 and Table 
2 show the major trading partners of Myanmar.4 According to the tables, China has 
constantly occupied a high ranking since 1988, when Myanmar-China border trade, 
hitherto an activity deemed illegal, was legitimized and formalized. This trade 
constituted 32% of total exports and ranked 1st and 23% of total imports and ranked 2nd
in 19885, although the whole external trade of Myanmar was small at that time. Since 
                                                 
4 Statistics Canada constructs the World Trade Database based on the United States 
Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade), and the database retrieval 
services are used for this paper. 
5 Import from Japan occupied more than thirty percent of Myanmar’s total imports 
before 1988, mainly due to the supplies related to Japan’s economic cooperation 
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then, Myanmar’s trade with China has grown rapidly. 
Myanmar’s imports from China grew more rapidly than its exports to China 
throughout the 1990s and up to 2005. Figure 1 shows the trade performance between 
Myanmar and China. It also shows figures from another data source, i.e. China 
Customs, which are available through 2005.6 The figure clearly shows the unbalanced 
performance of Myanmar’s exports and imports with China. While Myanmar’s exports 
to China increased by 1.3 times, from US $133.7 million in 1988 to US $169.4 million in 
2003,, its imports from China expanded by 7.1 times, from US $136.2 million in 1988 to 
US $967.2 million in 2003, resulting in a huge trade deficit of US $797.7 million in 2003, 
which was 4.4 times larger than Myanmar’s total trade deficit in the same year. 
(2) Export: Weak Impact on Economic Development 
Myanmar’s exports to China are mostly composed of wood, gem stones, and fruit and 
nuts (Table 3). However, it has become more and more dependent on wood exports, and 
eventually the share of wood exports occupied nearly 70% for the period between 2000 
and 2003. This trend continued through 2005, according to the China Customs.7 In 
contrast, the share of gem stones declined to a couple of percent by the early 2000s, 
probably because of the government’s export restrictions. Wood is exported mostly in the 
form of logs or roughly squared ones without much human and technical input. Such a 
high dependency on wood has made Myanmar’s exports to China rather stagnant, since 
it is constrained by the availability of natural resources. 
More importantly, wood extraction and its export in the form of logs seems to have a 
weak impact on broad-based economic and industrial development, because it fails to 
induce the improved utilization of existing factors of production, expanded factor 
endowments and linkage effects. This sharply contrasts with other newly emerged 
export products in the 1990s in Myanmar such as beans and pulses for Indian markets 
                                                                                                                                                 
programs. Japan suspended most aid after the political unrest of 1988, except a few 
on-going projects. Without full-fledged ODA programs, its share remarkably declined to 
less than five percent and ranked 6th in 2003. 
6 The World Trade Atlas database retrieval services are utilized to obtain the figures of 
the China Customs. The two sets of figures from the UN Comtrade and the China 
Customs are reasonably consistent. 
7 Data from the China Customs is classified by the Harmonized Commodity Description 
and Coding System (HS), and HS 44 (Wood) accounted for 69% in 2004 and 71% in 2005 
out of all China’s import from Myanmar. 
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and garments for the United States and EU markets, both of which had a considerable 
impact on the national economy. Fujita and Okamoto [2006:14-16] discuss that the 
cultivation of beans and pulses rapidly grew by utilizing thus far untapped domestic 
resources, including arable land and labor in the dry season. The sudden emergence of 
export markets provided farmers and merchants with incentives to utilize idle resources 
more fully and effectively. Such an export-driven development path is termed 
“vent-for-surplus” by Myanmar economist Hla Myint (Hla Myint [1959]). Garment 
export may also be described as the same kind, where big export markets were 
presented by the United States and the EU, and untapped unemployed and 
underemployed labor was mobilized from both urban and rural areas for this extremely 
labor-intensive industry. 
Contrasting these examples, wood extraction and log exports have not induced 
broad-based economic growth without the development of value-added wood-based 
industries in the downstream. Moreover, the Myanmar government does not seem to 
pay due attention to the sustainability of wood extraction and export. Some specialists 
warn that unless effective controls against excessive logging are implemented, 
Myanmar will lose one of its major exports in the foreseeable future.8
(3) Import: Major Supply Source 
Soon after the opening up of border trade in 1988, China suddenly appeared in trade 
statistics as a major supplier of commodities and goods to the Myanmar economy. 
Myanmar’s imports from China have increased since then, although imports have 
experienced ups and downs as shown in Figure 1.
Imports experienced rapid growth on two occasions: one in the first half of the 1990s 
and the other at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Accordingly, Myanmar has 
become more and more dependent on imports from China. The import share of Chinese 
goods in Myanmar’s total imports rose from about one-fifth in the latter half of the 
1990s to about one-third in 2003. 
The first rapid growth of Chinese imports was induced by the unleashing of pent-up 
demands of the Myanmar population after the open-door policy in 1988. Myanmar 
people had long been cut off from daily consumer goods and durables during the 
                                                 
8 See, for example, Global Witness [2005]. 
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socialist period. Once they got access, the demand for such goods shot up (Kudo 
[2005a:7-9]). While consumer goods occupied 6% and 12% of total imports in FY 19809
and FY 1985, respectively, the corresponding figures shot up to 35% and 42% in FY 1990 
and FY 1995 (CSO [2003:210]). China provided the main supply sources, and their 
products poured into the emerging consumer goods markets in Myanmar. 
Just after the opening up of border trade with China, textiles, mostly yarn and fabrics, 
flooded into Myanmar markets (Table 4). Textiles occupied nearly 40% of total Chinese 
imports for the period between 1988 and 1991. Then, tobacco increased its share up to 
14% for the subsequent period between 1992 and 1995. Road vehicles, power generators, 
electrical machinery and apparatus, and manufactures of metal accounted for about 5% 
each in the first half of the 1990s. 
Entering the second half of the 1990s, however, the inflow of Chinese imports 
stagnated. The government grew annoyed with the expanding trade deficits by the 
mid-1990s and resorted to stricter import controls, particularly on luxurious and 
non-essential goods. Accordingly, the influx of Chinese consumer goods and durables 
declined. Textiles and tobacco provide two examples. The former decreased its share 
from 38% for the period between 1988 and 1991 to 16% for the period between 1996 and 
1999; the latter declined from 14% for the period between 1992 and 1995 to 6% for the 
period between 1996 and 1999. 
In contrast, the import of capital and intermediate goods steadily increased 
throughout the 1990s. These goods were supplied to the emerging manufacturing sector 
for import-substitution in Myanmar. For example, machinery and transport equipment 
(SITC 7)10 increased its share from 12% for the period between 1988 and 1991 to 40% 
for the period between 1996 and 1999. Imported textiles (SITC 65) had been used not 
only for domestic consumption but also as raw materials for the growing export-oriented 
garment industry since the mid-1990s.11 A garment industry “boom” occurred in Yangon 
in the late 1990s and at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The rapid growth of 
the garment industry in Myanmar was partly supported by raw material supplies from 
China.
Myanmar’s imports from China showed rapid growth for the second time at the 
                                                 
9 FY stands for Fiscal Year starting from April and ending in March. 
10 SITC stands for Standard International Trade Classification. 
11 See Kudo [2005b] that provides a detailed account on the growth and decline of 
Myanmar’s garment industry in the 1990s and up to 2005. 
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beginning of the twenty-first century. Imports grew at the average annual rate of 22.7% 
for the period between 2000 and 2003. Textiles, road vehicles, power generators, electric 
machinery and apparatus, and general industrial machinery increased their share in 
total imports from China. 
Such an increase may reflect the huge inflow of Chinese economic cooperation and 
commercial loans. As will be discussed later in this paper, Chinese economic cooperation 
expanded in particular toward the end of the 1990s, when successive economic and 
technical cooperation programs were signed between two countries. Most of these are 
tied, whether legally or de facto, to Chinese companies, state-owned ones in particular, 
and induced imports from China. 
(4) Border Trade: Lifeline of the Myanmar Economy 
Trade between Myanmar and China is heavily dependent on their border trade. 
According to the district-wise export and import figures from the China Customs,12
coastal areas such as Shanghai, Shenzhen, Huangpu, and Nanjing naturally occupy the 
major share of the whole Chinese external trade. In contrast, Kunming, capital of 
Yunnan Province, accounts for less than one percent of China’s external trade. 
Since Yunnan is a landlocked province, commodities exported to or imported from 
Myanmar through the Kunming Customs Office are most likely transported by land 
through border gates such as Muse, Lwejel and Laiza. 13  Thus we regard the 
commodities that are cleared and recorded at the Kunming Customs as “border trade” 
in this paper.14 It means that the border trade between the two countries occupies less 
than one percent of China’s external trade. 
Even though the volume of border trade between the two countries is insignificant 
compared to China’s total external trade, it represents the lion’s share of China’s trade 
with Myanmar. Border trade occupied 58% of China’s exports to Myanmar and 82% of 
                                                 
12 The district-wise figures are available since 1999. 
13 There are five trade posts on the Myanmar side along with the border of Yunnan 
Province, i.e., Muse (mile 105), Lwejel, Laiza, Kanpeiktee, and Chinshwehaw. Among 
them, Muse (mile 105) is the most lucrative in terms of the volume of trade, accounting 
for 87% of the total in 2002 (Mya Than [2005:44]). 
14 Mya Than [2005:40] provides five different definitions of cross-border trade, i.e., 
formal or official border trade, informal border trade, illegal border trade (smuggling), 
transit trade and barter trade. He also points out that all statistics on border trade are 
usually underestimated. 
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its imports from Myanmar in 2005 (Table 5). Moreover, Yunnan Province’s share of 
Myanmar’s total border trade was 73%, whereas that of Thailand was 14% in FY 2003 
(Mya Than [2005:39]). Border trade is important for both Myanmar and Yunnan 
Province. 
The main route of border trade on Myanmar soil is the 460-kilometer-long road 
connecting Muse on the Chinese border, opposite to Ruili in Yunnan Province,15 and 
Mandalay, the second largest town in central Myanmar. This road constituted a part of 
the old “Burma Road” that opened in 1936 to supply Kuomintang (KMT) in Chunking. 
The road was paved and expanded for truck transportation in 1998 on a BOT basis by 
Asia World, one of the biggest private business conglomerates headed by the son of Lo 
Hsing-han, the former drug lord.16 Before the completion of the new road, it took a 
couple of days, and sometimes even a week, during the rainy season, to travel from 
Mandalay to Muse. Now it takes only twelve to sixteen hours by car. 
Border trade between the two countries has experienced ups and downs, reflecting not 
only market situations but also political, security and macroeconomic conditions in a 
broader sense. It also sometimes falls prey to illegitimate businesses, corruption, and 
power struggles. It is well known that the ouster of the former prime minister in 
October 2004 originated from the clash between intelligence and army units in Muse 
(Kyaw Yin Hlaing [2005:236]). Nevertheless, in spite of these ups and downs, border 
trade between the two countries has been legitimized, regularized and institutionalized. 
The first border trade agreement was signed by Myanmar Export and Import Services 
(MEIS) and Yunnan Machinery Import Export Corporation to use bank transactions 
between the Myanmar Foreign Trade Bank and the Kunming Branch of China Bank in 
August 1988. MEIS established border trade offices in Lashio, Muse, Kyukok, Nantkam 
and Koonlon. According to the Ministry of Commerce’s notification (No. 7/91), the 
so-called new border trade system has been carried out by MEIS since October 1991.17
The Myanmar government and Chinese government signed the border trade agreement 
in August 1994. The Border Trade Office was established in Muse in August 1995 and 
                                                 
15 See Map and Appendix for some photos of border trade activities in Ruili. 
16 A small part of the road in between was constructed and owned by another private 
company, Diamond Palace. The company is said to have been owned by the Military 
Intelligence headed by Khin Nyunt, then Secretary One of the SPDC. The Myanmar 
military saw the strategic importance of the road, and intended to avoid full ownership 
and operation by one private company. 
17 The new system in detail is not known to the author, though. 
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introduced “one-stop services” as a trial. The office was then extended to the full-fledged 
Border Trade Department of the Ministry of Commerce in August 1996. In July 1997, 
the “Export First Policy” was applied to border trade as well as seaborne trade, and 
imports were allowed only against export earnings thereafter. From November 1997, all 
border trade had to use US dollars to settle transactions, not local currencies such as 
Myanmar Kyat and Chinese Yuan. In January 1998, the Muse (105 mile) Office was 
expanded and started to function as a “one-stop services” border gate. 
There were further policy changes toward the end of 2000. From November 2000, local 
currencies such as the Myanmar Kyat and Chinese Yuan, could again be used for 
payment of border trade. From January 2001, the Border Control Force (Na Sa Kha) 
started to supervise and implement border trade activities. This force was led by a 
military intelligence officer and composed of all related organizations, including 
immigration, customs, internal revenue department, police offices, drug control offices, 
the Myanmar Economic Bank and so forth. The ostensible purpose of the force was to 
promote border trade in a systematic manner. In reality, however, military intelligence 
monopolized the most lucrative route of border trade, which eventually led to a major 
clash within the military as mentioned before. 
Both regularization and institutionalization of cross-border transactions and road 
development contributed to boosting border trade between the two countries at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century. China’s exports to Myanmar through border posts 
increased by 2.1 times, from US $261.2 million in FY 2001 to US $540.6 million in FY 
2005, whereas China’s imports from Myanmar via border trade expanded by 2.4 times, 
from US $93.7 million in FY 2001 to US $223.5 million in FY 2005. The Myanmar 
government also promoted all border trade not only with China but also with Thailand, 
India and Bangladesh to compensate for the economic sanctions imposed by the West, 
and the Chinese border recorded a most meaningful success. Thus, Myanmar’s border 
trade with China has become the lifeline of its economy. 
4. Economic and Business Cooperation 
China and Chinese enterprises are heavily involved in Myanmar’s industrial, 
infrastructure and energy development through economic cooperation. China is not a 
member country of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD, and it 
does not disclose its economic cooperation programs. The Myanmar government does 
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not disclose their receipt of economic cooperation from abroad, either. We can only grope 
for the reality from news and reports sporadically appearing in the press. In addition to 
this, China’s economic cooperation programs are often nothing more than 
commercial-based businesses. Even though Chinese enterprises offer suppliers’ credits 
at no or low interest, in reality they add the cost to the plants and commodities they 
export to Myanmar (Ebashi [2006:11]). On the other hand, most Chinese economic 
cooperation programs are tied to Chinese enterprises and state-owned ones in particular. 
It is difficult to distinguish genuine economic cooperation projects from commercial ones 
without detailed information. This section includes both cases.   
Gathering such scattered information, China’s provision of economic cooperation to 
Myanmar seems to have expanded around 1997 when the United States imposed 
economic sanctions that banned new foreign investments. Table 6 shows the list of 
agreements on economic and technical cooperation signed between the two countries 
after 1996. Moreover, Senior General Than Shwe’s state visit to Beijing in January 2003 
seemingly marked another epoch, when China offered Myanmar a preferential loan 
amounting to US $200 million and a RMB 50 million grant (equivalent to US $6.25 
million). Just after China’s commitment, the so-called “Black Friday” of May 30, 2003 
occurred and this event provoked the U.S. to impose stricter sanctions in July 2003, 
which included an import ban of all Myanmar-made products. Thus, China stepped into 
the vacuum that was created by the Western sanctions and compensated for Myanmar’s 
needs for trade and economic cooperation. 
China’s economic cooperation and businesses were directed to three main fields, i.e., 
infrastructure development, support to State-owned Economic Enterprises (SEEs), and 
energy exploitation. This section will examine the major projects in each field. 
(1) Infrastructure 
Among the many infrastructure projects financed and constructed by the Chinese 
government and Chinese enterprises, attention is immediately directed to those of 
electric power generation. Myanmar has suffered a severe shortage of electricity since 
the end of the 1990s and the government has initiated massive dam-building programs 
for hydro-power generation.18 According to a foreign businessman in Yangon, Chinese 
                                                 
18 For details, see Akimoto [2004]. 
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companies constructed six hydro-power plants and one thermal power station for the 
period between 1996 and 2005, the installed capacity of which constitutes about 
one-third of the entire national capacity (Ebashi [2006:10]). 
Among them, the Paunglaung Hydro-power Project clearly showed the financial, 
managerial and technical capabilities of Chinese companies in this field. It was 
completed by the Yunnan Machinery Import and Export Corporation (YMIEC) in March 
2005. Its installed capacity of power generation (280 MW) surpasses that of Baluchaung 
(168 MW), which had long been the biggest power source constructed by Japanese 
companies with Japanese war reparations and economic cooperation after the World 
War Two. The Paunglaung Dam Project was the biggest undertaking of the YMIEC. 
Indeed, it was China’s largest hydro-power plant exported to Southeast Asia and 
Yunnan’s largest foreign trade project. The total cost of the project was estimated at US 
$160 million, which was financed by the Export-Import Bank of China (China Exim 
Bank).
As of March 2006, there are eleven major on-going hydro-power projects, with a total 
generating capacity of 1734 MW. Contracts were signed for seven projects and all of 
them were with Chinese enterprises. The largest project is the Yeywa hydro-power 
plant with the capacity of 790 MW. Yeywa will cost US $700 million. In August 2003, the 
China Exim Bank approved a US $200 million loan at preferential interest rates for the 
project (Bosshard [2004]). The China Water Resources and Hydropower Construction 
Group (Sinohydro) and the China International Trust and Investment Corporation 
(CITIC) got contracts to provide generators and other equipment for the project. In 
addition to low-priced machinery and equipment and services, long-term and 
low-interest loans and export credits offered by public financial institutions made it 
possible for Chinese enterprises to become major players in this field. 
Another significant Chinese economic cooperation in infrastructure development is 
the Ayeyawaddy Transportation Project, which provides a transport line from Yunnan to 
Thilawa Port in Yangon. This project seemingly started in October 1999, when a high 
level Chinese delegation accompanied by Khin Nyunt visited Bhamo, navigation head 
on the Ayeyarwaddy. This project includes three infrastructure developments, that is, 
constructing a container port near Bhamo, upgrading the road from the new container 
port to Muse/Lwejel on the Chinese border, and dredging the river to secure a vessel 
lane. The Myanmar Port Authority plans to transport two million containers per year in 
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the future.19 It also plans to construct a container yard, office buildings, residences and 
other amenities in the hinterland. 
Yunnan Province obviously seeks a direct access route through Myanmar to a sea port 
from which it can export products to South Asia, Middle East and Europe. Such an 
outlet would also reduce transport costs and time, and would avoid the Malacca Strait 
in the event of a conflict in the South China Sea (Malik [1998:114]). With the completion 
of the project, the Ayeyawaddy will link China’s southwest frontier to the Bay of Bengal 
and Andaman Sea. 
(2) State-owned Economic Enterprises 
Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, the Myanmar government has 
accelerated the construction of new state-owned factories (Kudo [2005a:12-14]). The 
number of such factories increased by only 19 for the five years between FY 1985 and 
FY 1990, by 92 for the next five years between FY 1990 and FY 1995, and by around 20 
to 30 per year up to 2000. Thereafter there was impressive growth, with 53 public 
industrial enterprises being set up in FY 2001 and 231 in FY 2002. Most of the new 
factories are of the import-substitution industry that target domestic markets. Such a 
policy shift may reflect the government’s drive toward self-sufficiency in both 
agricultural and industrial sectors.20
China’s economic cooperation programs strongly supported the massive construction 
of state-owned factories such as textile mills, plywood plants, rice mills, pulp and paper 
mills, sugar mills, agriculture equipment factories, and other light manufacturing 
facilities. Table 7 shows examples of the factories of the Ministry of Industry (1) that 
were constructed with the provision of Chinese financial and technical support and 
their machinery and equipment. Without Chinese support, these factories would never 
have materialized. 
However, Myanmar’s SEEs have a long history of inefficiency, poor management and 
vulnerability to all the ills that plague public industry, including rent-seeking activities 
and corruption (Kudo [2005a:12]). The SEEs are highly controlled by the central 
government in both financial and managerial terms. With the lack of financial and 
                                                 
19 Interview with the Myanmar Port Authority in Bhamo in September, 2002. 
20  The agricultural policy of Myanmar exhibited a strong inclination toward 
self-sufficiency. See Fujita and Okamoto [2006]. 
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managerial autonomy, the newly built state-owned factories would not efficiently 
operate. Proliferating state-owned factories may become a burden on the government 
budget, and eventually bad loans of Chinese stakeholders. 
(3) Energy Development 
As its economy rapidly grows, China’s quest for energy sources abroad has expanded.  
Myanmar’s oil and gas reserves have naturally drawn China’s attention. However, 
China’s presence in Myanmar’s oil and gas fields has been observed only recently. The 
China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) signed six contracts on production 
sharing with the Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE) of the Ministry of Energy 
from October 2004 to January 2005.21 The China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation 
(SINOPEC) and its subsidiary Dian Quiangui Petroleum Exploration also work the 
inland fields. Moreover, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and its 
subsidiary Chinnery Assets also won contracts to upgrade the four old oilfields in 
central Myanmar. 
These companies are now at various stages of exploration and they have already made 
the financial commitment of US $163 million. The Chinese investment is rather small 
compared to the total amount of foreign investment in Myanmar’s oil and gas sector of 
US $2,635 million, the largest recipient of foreign investment accounting for 34% of 
total outstanding. 22  However, it is only recently that Chinese companies have 
vigorously started to invest in Myanmar. Out of twenty-six Chinese foreign investments, 
sixteen projects were made either in FY 2004 or 200523, occupying nearly 70% in terms 
of investment value. Most of those were invested in the energy and mining sector. 
Another big project is PetroChina’s plan to build a gas pipeline from A-1 block in the 
Shwe field off the coast of Rahine State to Yunnan Province. The Shwe field comprises 
several blocks of gas of unconfirmed size. Of these, A-1 block is estimated to be the 
largest, containing 2.88 trillion to 3.56 trillion cubic feet of gas. PetroChina signed a 
memorandum of understanding with MOGE to buy gas from the block for thirty years 
starting from 2009. 
                                                 
21 Information is from New Light of Myanmar, Myanmar Times and so forth. 
22  It is said that there is a large number of informal Chinese investments and 
businesses in Myanmar, most of which are under the names of Myanmar citizens. Such 
cases do not appear in the Myanmar Investment Commission (MIC) statistics. 
23 Figures are available up to November 2005. 
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Myanmar already exports natural gas to Thailand through the pipeline and it reached 
US $1.5 billion in 2005, becoming the biggest foreign earner. Myanmar will have 
another big source of foreign earnings from gas exports to China in the near future. 
Moreover, oil and gas exports offer the Myanmar government a diplomatic advantage 
over its neighboring countries. Indeed, India also made great efforts to secure 
Myanmar’s gas from the same A-1 block. India eventually reached an agreement with 
Myanmar to purchase the gas with more favorable conditions based on "take or pay", by 
which India gives Myanmar guaranteed earnings every year even if it is not able to 
access the gas. Myanmar has come out the winner in the Sino-India rivalry for energy. 
5. Conclusion: Can China Support the Myanmar Economy? 
Against the background of closer diplomatic, political and security ties between 
Myanmar and China since 1988, their economic relations have also grown stronger 
throughout the 1990s and up to the present. China is now a major supplier of consumer 
goods, durables, machinery and equipment, and intermediate products to Myanmar. 
China also offers markets for Myanmar’s exports such as wood, agricultural produce, 
marine products, minerals, and recently oil and gas. Border trade provides a direct 
route connecting the center of Upper Myanmar to Yunnan Province in China. Both 
physical infrastructure developments such as roads and bridges and 
institutionalization of cross-border transactions, including “one-stop services,” promote 
border trade. Without the massive influx of Chinese products, the Myanmar economy 
may have suffered severer shortages of commodities. Without the opening up of China’s 
export markets, Myanmar may have suffered severer shortages of foreign currencies. 
China also provides a large amount of economic cooperation and commercial-based 
financing in the areas of infrastructure, state-owned economic enterprises, and oil and 
gas exploitation. Without Chinese long-term loans with low interest rates, the 
Myanmar government could not have implemented its massive construction of 
state-owned factories such as textile and sugar mills. Although China’s official foreign 
investment is rather small, it is not insignificant in that it has recently poured into oil 
and gas exploration. Chinese enterprises may soon be major players in this booming 
field in Myanmar. To be sure, Myanmar’s economy is now heavily dependent on 
economic ties with China. 
However, its lopsided trade with China has failed to have a substantial impact on 
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Myanmar’s broad-based economic and industrial development. About seventy percent 
of Myanmar’s export to China is wood in the form of logs or roughly squared ones. Wood 
extraction and its export is quite different from other major export items such as beans 
and pulses and garments in that the latter has induced the improved utilization of 
existing factors of production such as land and labor in the whole economy. In contrast, 
wood export is no more than an exploitation of a limited natural resource that 
happened to remain untapped during the past closed period. 
China’s economic cooperation and commercial loans apparently support the present 
regime, but their effects on the whole economy will also be quite limited under an 
unfavorable macroeconomic environment and distorted incentives structure. In 
particular, the newly built state-owned factories may become a burden on the Myanmar 
government budget and eventually bad loans of Chinese stakeholders. 
After all, strengthened economic ties with China will be instrumental in regime 
survival in the midst of economic sanctions by Western nations. However, it will not be 
a powerful force promoting the process of broad-based economic development in 
Myanmar.
 19
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Map: New “Burma Road” Connecting Mandalay and Muse (Ruili) 
(Source) UN. Available from http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/myanmar.pdf.
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Appendix: Photos of Border Trade Activities in the Jiegao Special Zone of Ruili City 
1. Border Gate for Trucks 
Myanmar trucks are entering the Jiegao Special Zone of Ruili City in Yunnan 
Province, China, through the border gate. The opposite side of this gate is Muse 
City in Shan State, Myanmar. [Photo taken on March 8, 2006, by the author] 
2. Transshipment of Cargoes  
Myanmar workers are unloading goods from a Chinese truck (right) and loading 
them onto a Myanmar truck (left) at the truck yard in the Jiegao Special Zone. 
[Photo taken on March 8, 2006, by the author] 
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3. Exchange of Currencies 
A Myanmar truck driver 
exchanges two currencies, 
Myanmar Kyat and Chinese 
Yuan, at the truck yard in 
the Jiegao Special Zone. 
[Photo taken on March 8, 
2006, by the author]  
4. Border Gate for People 
Local people come and go from one country to the other. The other side across the 
border gate is Muse City, Myanmar. There are casinos along the border in Muse. 
[Photo taken on March 8, 2006, by the author] 
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5. Joint Check Centre of Ruili Port 
On the Chinese border side, the Joint Check Centre of Ruili Port provides “one- 
stop services” for truck transportation. [Photo taken on March 8, 2006, by the 
author]
6. Border Police Inspection Centre 
Just before the Salween River (Nu Jiang), all vehicles from the border areas with 
Myanmar are stopped for police inspection for illegal goods and activities. No 
vehicles and passengers can travel to Kunming, capital of Yunnan Province, 
without crossing the river. [Photo taken on March 9, 2006, by the author] 
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